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Fringe benefits compensation offered by employers has grown rapidly 
over the past 50 years. Research in this area has been primarily 
limited to hourly and salaried employees. This study examines 
employer-based fringe benefits compensation of real estate agents 
and brokers. A model is developed that jointly estimates the income, 
hours worked, and fringe benefits compensation. The findings indicate 
that fringe benefits increase according to hours worked and the sales 
professional’s contribution to firm revenue. Other important 
determinants include managerial duties, firm size and organizational 
form. For women, fringe benefits do not entice greater productivity 
(income); however, it does increase effort (hours worked).  
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1. Introduction 
 
Researchers have extensively studied the determinants of real estate agent 
income. The studies are largely based on economic models found in human 
capital model literature (Mincer, 1970), and models typically include 
demographic and skill characteristics of agents and their employing firms as 
well as market variables.1  Agent income underestimates total compensation 
by the dollar value of fringe benefits. Graves et al. note substantial omitted 
variable bias associated with excluding fringe benefits when attempting to 
examine total compensation. One reason is that the growth in employer fringe 
benefits as a proportion of the total compensation package has been strong 
over the past 50 years. Chen (1981) finds that fringe benefits were 5% of total 
compensation in 1950, but by 1980, it had more than tripled to 15.8%. In 
March 2010, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that total benefits 
were about 30% of the total compensation for civilian workers and private 
industry, and 34% for state and local government workers.  
 
Sales professionals are compensated differently than salaried or hourly 
employees because they are often paid on commission. In some cases such as 
real estate, they frequently act as independent contractors who set their own 
hours, and have some ability to negotiate their terms of employment.2 From a 
fringe benefits perspective, real estate agents and brokers are typically 
responsible for arranging and paying for their own fringe benefits. This may 
occur because firms in this industry tend to be relatively small, and therefore 
lack the ability to have the cost savings associated with large group plans, 
such as by offering health, life, and disability insurances. 
 
The dearth of research on sales professionals represents an opportunity for 
further study particularly because of the large number of workers employed in 
sales occupations. In real estate sales, for example, the BLS Occupational 
Outlook Handbook estimates there were 517,800 real estate brokers and sales 
agents employed in 2008 with projected employment of 592,100 by 2018.  
 
This research study examines the interaction of fringe benefits with income 
(productivity) and hours worked (effort) for real estate agents and brokers on 
split commission with their firms. A model is applied to subsamples of men 
and women. The findings indicate that fringe benefits affect income and hours 
worked, but do so differently for men and women.  The firm size, as 
confirmed from previous research, is an important variable that influences 
fringe benefits, but organizational characteristics influence offerings of fringe 
benefits as well.  
                                                     
1 See Benjamin et al. (2000) for a summary of earnings studies of real estate agents 
and brokers. 
2 Some agents arrange a 100% commission with their firm, but pay a fee, while others 
split the commission with the firm (Benjamin et al. (2007, 2009) and Zumpano et al. 
(2009)). 
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2. Literature 
 
Employers offer fringe benefits to attract the best workers, but also to retain 
them. Parker and Rhine (1991) conclude that the offering of fringe benefits 
reduces employee turnover, and Frazis and Loewenstein (2009) find that the 
rate of resignation is more responsive to fringe benefits than to wages.  
 
Workers in larger firms are more likely to receive fringe benefits through their 
employer. Because of cost, small firms more often do not offer extensive 
benefits packages. The US General Accounting Office (2000) reports that 
82% of employees in businesses with fewer than 25 employees do not have 
pension coverage. Fronstin and Helman (2000) find that 43% of businesses 
with fewer than 100 employees do not offer health coverage for their workers. 
This absence of important fringe benefits at many small firms makes them 
particularly susceptible to employee turnover.  
 
Researchers in the labor literature typically view the labor supply and wages 
as jointly determined (Moffitt (1984); Lundberg (1985); and Blank (1988)). 
Wage-hours models have been applied to workers in nonmanufacturing 
industries, such as construction (Perloff and Sickles, 1987) and physician 
services (Headen, 1990).  Benjamin et al. (2007, 2009) have applied wage-
labor supply models to real estate sales professionals although there have been 
comparatively few such studies. 3 Table 1 summarizes the determinants of 
wages, earnings, and hours in real estate brokerage; these determinants might 
logically explain fringe benefits compensation as well.4 Averett and Hotchkiss 
(1994, 1995) extend the labor supply–wages model by including fringe 
benefits compensation. Their model includes three equations: one equation 
each for the dependent variables of benefits, hours, and natural log of wages.  
                                                     
3 The wage rate for real estate agents and brokers is determined by income generated 
from sales and commissions divided by hours worked because there is no contracted 
wage rate. Benjamin et al. (2007, 2009) note that sample selection problems are 
associated with full- versus part-time status. Part-time workers may sell primarily to 
social networks, including friends and family. Although their total income may be 
modest, the wage (income per hour of work) is greater than the full-time sales 
professional who must sell outside the network.  
4 Agent income has been shown to be positively related to schooling and experience 
(Crellin, Frew and Jud (1988); Glower and Hendershott (1988); Jud and Winkler 
(1998)). Some studies have found that women earn less than men in real estate 
brokerage (Crellin, Frew and Jud (1988); Sirmans and Swicegood (1997, 2000); Jud 
and Winkler (1998)) while other studies find no significant difference (Follain, Lutes 
and Meier (1987)) or a positive effect (Abelson, Kacmar and Jackofsky (1990)). 
Earnings have been found to increase with firm size (Follain, Lutes and Meier (1987), 
Sirmans and Swicegood (2000)) and metro area (Sirmans and Swicegood (1998)). Not 
surprisingly, the same relationships occur with wages as a productivity measure. Hours 
worked is most often negatively associated with schooling, age, experience and 
gender, while positively associated with metro areas and the wage rate. See Benjamin 
et al. (2000) for a summary of earnings studies of real estate agents and brokers. 
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Table 1 Variables that Influence Earnings, Wages and Labor Supply 
of Real Estate Brokerage Sales Professionals 
Variable Earnings1 Wage2 Hours Worked2 
Age  - / 0 + / 0 - 
Education + + / 0 - 
Experience + + - 
Gender (female) - - - 
Ethnicity (minority) - / 0 - - / 0 
Marital status (married) + / 0 + 0 
Owner  + + 0 
Firm size + + + / 0 
Franchise 0 + / 0 ? 
Metro area + + + 
Wage   + 
Hours worked + +   
Notes: Key: 0 = neutral or inconclusive effect; (+) positive effect; (- ) negative effect 
Sources: 1. Benjamin, Jud and Sirmans (2000) 
2. Averett and Hotchkiss (1994), Benjamin et al. (2007, 2009), Blank (1988), 
Headen (1990), Moffitt (1984), and Perloff and Sickles (1987) 
 
 
Alpert and Ozawa (1986) were among the first to examine fringe benefits 
offered in the non-manufacturing sector, including office and non-office 
workers.  They find that the marginal tax rate, skills, education level, full-time 
status, union status, firm size, firm location, and type of industry are 
positively related to expenditures on fringe benefits.  Turner (1987) suggests 
that the effect of taxes on fringe benefits growth is rather small; however, 
Royalty et al. (2000) find that the marginal tax rate is positively and 
significantly related to the probability of offering health insurance, paid sick 
leave and pensions. Because employers pay taxes on the size of payroll, 
benefits compensation is less expensive than wages. Workers with low wages 
and low hours do not gain as much from non-taxed benefits, and prefer cash 
compensation.  
 
Averett and Hotchkiss (1995) find that hours worked by workers are 
positively related to benefits. One explanation from the firm’s perspective is 
that the average cost of a fringe benefit to the firm should decline as a 
worker’s hours increase.  Albert and Ozawa (1986) argue that employees who 
earned high wages, and therefore paid high taxes, should possess more 
benefits as well. Because fringe benefits are a normal good, it is expected that 
workers should demand more fringe benefits as their earnings increase. 
Therefore, agent income, hours and fringe benefits could be interrelated 
variables.  
 
Demographic variables such as gender, ethnicity, age, education, and marital 
status may affect a worker’s preference for fringe benefits compensation as 
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well. Averett and Hotchkiss (1995) find that female gender, education, and 
marital status are positively related to fringe benefits. Bernstein (2002) has 
developed an empirical model that relates to whether a firm offers a particular 
fringe benefit (pension or health insurance) to the characteristics of both the 
firm and owner. He finds that education, race, full-time status, and firm 
characteristics are all related to the probability of offering a pension and 
health insurance. Clauretie (2002) reports that on average, females have 
higher medical expenses compared with males, and are more likely to possess 
medical insurance, consistent with research by Lowen and Sicilian (2009).  
 
Evidence in the labor economics literature, in fact, suggests that the gender 
wage gap may be partially explained by gender occupational segregation, and 
that differences in preferences or abilities may explain the segregation. Olson 
(2002) finds a statistically and economically meaningful trade-off between 
wages and health insurance for women working full-time. Women accepted 
about a 20% reduction in wages to move to a job that provides health benefits. 
Lowen and Sicilian (2009), however, find no significant effects of fringe 
benefits on wages for either men or women. 
 
Regardless of whether or not fringe benefits compensation explains the wage 
gap, women may prefer jobs that offer fringe benefits that align with the needs 
of the family. Lowen and Sicilian (2009) report that while women are more 
likely to receive “family-friendly” benefits than men, both received family-
neutral benefits at about the same rate. Once occupation was incorporated in 
the analysis, gender does not have a significant influence on the probability of 
receiving fringe benefits with the exception of parental leave.  
 
Studies have found that fringe benefits are associated with age. Alpert and 
Ozawa (1986) hypothesize that relatively older workers may demand more 
security that fringe benefits such as health care insurance offer, but they do 
not find a statistically significant relationship. Moreover, Clauretie (2002) 
finds that annual medical expenses paid by the employer’s insurance policy 
increase with age, but at a decreasing rate. Oyer (2008) reports that medical 
and life insurances appear to encourage long-term employment, and consistent 
with Averett and Hotchkiss, he finds that married workers are more likely to 
receive health insurance. 
 
Firm characteristics may influence fringe benefits offerings as well. Alpert 
and Ozawa (1986), Averett and Hotchkiss (1995), and Claurettie (2000) have 
all found a positive relationship between firm size and fringe benefits; this 
positive relationship is also borne out by the BLS compensation data. An 
efficient purchasing model for fringe benefits is important for employers 
according to Oyer (2008). This result suggests that large firms have cost 
advantages in providing fringe benefits because of the economies of scale.  
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Because fringe benefits are a normal good, consumption should rise with 
productivity as benefits become more affordable. Therefore, it is necessary to 
control for total household income rather than just the wage or an individual’s 
income, because fringe benefits affordability should be tied to residual income 
available from the household rather than just the worker’s income. 
 
Although the BLS has total employee compensation data, important 
information is missing, such as commission split, personal real estate 
holdings, ownership and firm-specific data. Therefore, data from the Member 
Survey of the National Association of Realtors® (NAR) is used for this study. 
The examination of fringe benefits compensation of real estate sales 
professionals by using the NAR® data permits research into specific sales 
professional occupations (broker-owner, broker-manager, and associate 
broker) and organizational form (independent firm versus a subsidiary). The 
income, hours and fringe benefits relationships are separately examined for 
males and females as gender may incur significantly different results. 
 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
 
Suppose the commission split c paid by each firm to its sales professionals is 
an increasing, concave function of productivity S: )(Sfc = , so that sales 
professionals who are more productive and generate higher gross sales income 
S for the firm receive an equal or higher commission split than those with 
lower sales. Furthermore, higher producing professionals are able to negotiate 
a commission split so that the firm’s revenue increases with gross sales 
income, but at a decreasing rate, i.e., the firm’s revenue is concave in gross 
sales income. The sales income of the individual sales professional is cS  and 
the firm’s portion (revenue) is )1( cSR −= . The commission schedule f  
therefore satisfies ,10 <′+< fSf and .02 >′′+′ fSf   Also, suppose the 
productivity of each sales professional is an increasing, concave function of 
hours worked (effort) h: )(hgS = .  
 
First, suppose firms do not offer fringe benefits packages. Each sales 
professional decides on the amount of time that s/he works h by maximizing 
his or her utility ),( lwU  over income cSw =  and leisure hTl −= . The gross 
sales income is split between the firm and the individual professional, 
,SRw =+  and since the firm’s revenue is concave, the individual’s income is 
convex in gross sales: 0≥SSw . However, it is assumed that the individual’s 
income is concave in hours worked; this will be the case if 
( ) .02 ≤′′+′ gwgw SSS  It follows that if his or her utility has a negative definite 
Hessian matrix, then his or her utility as a function of hours worked, 
)),(),(()( hlhwUhu ≡  is concave and therefore, the solution to the first order 
Fringe Benefits Compensation of Real Estate Agents and Brokers    259 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
condition (FOC), ,0)( =−′ lSw UhgwU  is necessarily his or her optimal effort. 
Let h0 denote the optimal effort of the individual professional, S0 the 
corresponding gross sales income, and R0 the corresponding firm revenue that 
s/he generates.  
 
Now suppose the firm offers a single benefits package to its sales 
professionals. The package is determined by the composition of its sales force, 
firm characteristics, and owner preferences. Because of the firm’s size and 
bargaining power with insurance companies, it could obtain the benefits 
package at a lower cost than the employee could himself or herself. Therefore 
the package that costs the firm b is worth kb, where 1>k , to the sales 
professional.  
 
With no constraints, offering benefits is a cost to the firm with no rewards 
because a sales professional will optimally choose to work fewer hours while 
maintaining the same consumption that s/he had with no benefits. To recoup 
this cost, the firm requires that the sales professional generate an amount b in 
additional firm revenue in order to qualify for benefits. This additional 
revenue can be generated two ways: 1) the employee can choose to work 
additional hours, or 2) the employee surrenders some of his or her 
commission split.  
 
Let c0 denote the commission split of the sales professional and w0 = c0S0 his 
or her income before being offered the benefits package. If the sales 
professional chooses to take a cut in his or her commission split to generate 
the additional firm revenue b, his or her new commission split c1 is 
determined by bcScS =−−− )1()1( 0010 , i.e., 
0
01 S
bcc −= . In this case, his 
or her total income W is the sum of his or her sales income and benefits: 
bkwkbScW )1(001 −+=+= ; thus his or her total income increases 
while working the same number of hours and s/he is clearly better off than 
when s/he did not receive benefits. If  the employee instead chooses to 
increase his or her effort to 1h  to generate the additional firm revenue b, then 
the gross sales income that s/he brings in is now )( 11 hgS =  and his or her 
new sales income is  ,00101111 bwSSbRSRSw −+−=−−=−= and so, 
his or her new total income is .)1(0011 bkwSSkbwW −++−=+=   
Compared with the previous case, in which the employee takes a commission 
cut to generate the additional revenue, his or her income is greater by 01 SS −  
but his or her leisure is reduced by 01 hh − . Whether his or her utility is 
greater in this case than in the previous case depends on his or her particular 
utility functional form. However, there should be some level of effort at which 
sales professionals will definitely not choose to work any more additional 
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hours (for fear of suffering from exhaustion), so those with higher income are 
more likely to reduce income to receive benefits. Thus, there is likely a 
tradeoff between income and fringe benefits. 5 On the other hand, because 
professionals cannot reduce their effort in order to receive benefits, benefits 
should be positively related to both hours worked and the individual’s 
contribution to firm revenue. 
 
 
4. Empirical Model 
 
The empirical model includes equations for sales professional gross income, 
hours worked and fringe benefits. While gross income and hours worked are 
readily definable, fringe benefits data are available as binary variables; 
whether or not the particular fringe benefit is offered through the employer. 
Because the relative impact of individual fringe benefits on other variables is 
likely to be relatively small and dispersed, it is necessary to aggregate 
information from these separate variables. Factor analysis is an efficient 
method to capture variation in a related set of variables. The benefits offered 
include medical insurance (health, dental, and vision), life insurance, 
disability insurance, errors and omissions (E & O) insurance, a retirement plan 
(SEP/401K), paid vacation, and a generic “other” fringe benefit. The benefits 
variable is developed by scoring from the first factor by using a principle 
components analysis, and the score is estimated from the factor loadings. The 
factor analysis approach permits the weighing of benefits to account for the 
variance in the correlations. 6 The primary factor score is then used as an 
independent variable in an iterative three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
regression model of income, hours worked and fringe benefits. The fringe 
benefits (Benf) variable is expected to be related to explanatory variables, 
including salesperson demographics and occupation, firm characteristics, the 
economic environment, income and hours worked.  The variables are 
described in Table 2.  
 
 
                                                     
5 A special situation occurs for agents on 100% contracts. For these agents, there is no 
possibility to increase the split to the firm and the firm does not benefit by the agent 
working more hours. Therefore, the monthly fee would need to be adjusted by the firm 
to pay for the fringe benefits. The monthly fee data is not available. Therefore, agents 
on a 100% contract are excluded from the model. 
6 Another approach for using a binary variable is to simply add the number of benefits 
or to calculate the percentage of total benefits received by the sales professional 
relative to total benefits available. These measures are tested as well, and the findings 
from the regression analysis are comparable to using the factor analysis variable. 
However, the factor analysis variable weighs the fringe benefits according to the 
correlation with the factor. In addition, it offers a normal distribution centered at zero 
which is an important consideration when using fringe benefits as a dependent variable 
in a 3SLS model. 
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Table 2 Definitions of Variables 
Dependent Variables of Sales Professional: 
lnGinc Natural logarithm of annual gross income 
Hrs Hours worked per week 
Benf Fringe benefits from factor analysis scoring 
Demographic Variables of Sales Professional: 
Sch Years of schooling 
Exp Years of experience in real estate 
Expsq Years of experience in real estate squared 
Married Marital status (Married = 1) 
Female Gender (Female = 1) 
Black Ethnicity status (Black = 1) 
Hisp Ethnicity status (Hispanic = 1) 
Asian Ethnicity status (Asian = 1) 
Abrk Associate broker status (Abrk = 1) 
Brkown Broker-owner status (Brkow = 1) 
Mgrsel Manager-sales status (Mgrsel = 1) 
Comspt (%) Commission split in percent 
Cpinv Number of commercial properties held for investment purpose by the agent or broker 
Rpinv Number of residential properties held for investment purpose by the agent or broker 
Firm and Metropolitan Area Variables: 
Indf Independent franchise firm status (Indf = 1) 
Indnf Independent non-franchise firm status (Indnf = 1) 
lnFsize Natural logarithm of firm size measured by the number of sales staff 
lnMpsh Natural logarithm of the median single-family housing price by metropolitan area 
Chgemp (%) Change in employment in the metropolitan area in percent 
Income Variables: 
lnFrev Natural logarithm of annual gross firm revenue attributable to the sales professional 
lnRinc Natural logarithm of annual household income minus gross income of the sales professional  
 
 
The first equation is the specification of a fringe benefits model which 
consists of variables that capture demographic characteristics, hours worked, 
gross and residual income, and firm revenue: 
=Benf  Z β1 BFrevRincGincHrs µββββ +++++ lnlnln 5432     (1) 
where Z is a matrix of demographic explanatory variables with regression 
coefficient matrix β1; Hrs is hours worked by the sales professional; lnGinc is 
the natural logarithm of annual gross income of the professional; lnRinc is the 
natural logarithm of the professional’s residual income;, and lnFrev is the 
natural logarithm of firm revenue contributed by the professional. The 
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individual regression coefficients , β2, β3, and β4, are the individual regression 
coefficients, and μB is the error term. The variables in Z consists of variables 
that measure the demographic characteristics of the sales professionals, 
including: years of schooling (Sch), experience (Exp), experience squared 
(Expsq), marital status (Married), gender (Female), ethnicity (Black, 
Hispanic, and Asian), and specific real estate sales occupation (Abrk, Brkown, 
and Mrgsel). 
 
This specification suggests that sales professionals choose their desired level 
of fringe benefits from among firms that offer different packages; however, 
more expensive fringe benefits packages require that the firm receive more 
revenue from the sales professional to pay for the cost of the benefits. 
Therefore, the agent or broker must choose between receiving more income or 
fringe benefits.7 
 
Sales professionals in the sample differ in their occupational level and duties. 
For example, associate brokers have neither an ownership position nor 
managerial responsibilities. However, there are also broker-owners and 
broker-managers with selling responsibilities. Both should receive more fringe 
benefits than associate brokers because their time is diverted from sales 
activities to office and managerial duties. The distinct occupational 
differences are captured by the associate broker (Abrk), broker-owner 
(Brkown), manager-salesperson (Mgrsel) statuses.  
 
Two variables for the firm type (independent and non-independent franchises) 
are included in the model. Independent firms are typically smaller than 
subsidiaries of larger firms, so both non-franchise and franchise independent 
firms are expected to offer fewer fringe benefits. To control for economic 
environment conditions, the natural log of the median housing price and the 
percent change in employment are included in the model; both variables are 
expected to be positively related to fringe benefits. These variables are 
captured by independent non-franchise firm (Indnf); independent franchise 
firm (Indf); the natural logarithm of the number of sales staff firm (lnFsize); 
the natural logarithm of the median metro single-family housing price in 2007 
(lnMpsh); and  the percent change in employment during 2007 (Chgemp). 
 
The number of hours worked per week (Hrs) is expected to be strongly and 
positively associated with fringe benefits. Full-time workers often gain fringe 
                                                     
7 While it is conceivable that an individual firm could offer various fringe benefit 
packages of various dollar values, with agents and brokers having to generate higher 
firm revenue to receive package of greater value, there are practical reasons why this is 
unlikely. Besides the complexity and administrative cost of managing individual 
contracts with salespersons, the cost of fringe benefits, such as insurance, decline with 
the number of enrolled employees. Brokerage firms that offer many different fringe 
benefits package choices would not be able to offer them at a cost attractive to the firm 
and their employees.   
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benefits which are not available to part-timers. The number of hours required 
to be eligible for fringe benefits is likely to vary by brokerage firm. 
 
Potentially important variables that influence fringe benefits are the gross 
income from the individual and income from other family members. While 
gross income from the agent or broker may be predicted to increase fringe 
benefits consumption, as higher income makes fringe benefits more 
affordable, there is the opposing argument that suggests that employers who 
pay for fringe benefits may reduce the sales professional’s income in response 
to offering more fringe benefits. That is, the brokerage firm in a competitive 
environment will not offer more than it needs to pay. Gross income variable is 
included in the model in natural logarithm terms as lnGinc. 
 
Income available from other family members may influence fringe benefits 
consumption; however, it has not been examined in most fringe benefits 
studies. This variable is particularly important because two-income families 
are commonplace, and the preference for a fringe benefit package is likely to 
be related to affordability extended to total household income, not just income 
from the individual. The effect of residual income on fringe benefits 
consumption should be positive. The natural logarithm of residual income 
enters the model, and it is designated as lnRinc.8 
 
In addition to income from the individual and residual income from other 
household members, fringe benefits should increase with agent and broker 
revenue generated for the firm, where lnFrev is the natural log of firm revenue 
generated by the sales professional. Brokerage firms might offer fringe 
benefits more often and in greater amounts to agents and brokers who 
contribute more to the profitability of the firm. 
 
Because there is likely a trade-off between income and fringe benefits, lnGinc 
is an endogenous variable. The lnGinc, lnFrev and Hrs variables are 
endogenous in the Benf equation, so they are estimated by using predicted 
values that use the two-stage least-squares (2SLS). 9 This ensures that the 
values of the explanatory variables are not correlated with the regression error 
term.10 
                                                     
8 The percent income tax rate of the sales professional is excluded from the empirical 
model because the marginal tax rate is strongly collinear with the salesperson’s 
income. Subsequent tests of this variable also indicate that it does not have a 
statistically significant relationship with the fringe benefits variable. 
9 In addition, lnFrev equation (1a) is also an endogenous variable. The firm’s portion 
of revenue generated by agents and brokers are influenced by the same variables as 
lnInc because total revenue is split between the individual and the firm; therefore, 
these independent variables are used for the fitted lnFrev regression.  
10  The affordability of fringe benefits should be positively related to the sales 
professional’s income. However, at a given level of total compensation, if a company 
offers additional fringe benefits, it should reduce income that the firm would offer the 
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The second equation is the specifications of the labor supply equation: 
=Hrs Xθ1 HBenfRincInc µβθθ ++++ 432 lnln               (2) 
where X is the matrix of exogenous explanatory variables with regression 
coefficient matrix θ1  and the other variables are previously defined. The 
individual regression coefficients are θ2, θ3, and θ4; and μH is the error term. 
The X matrix includes the explanatory variables in Z with some differences. 
Entrepreneurial variables are added to the labor supply equation to measure 
skill and wealth.  More capable salespersons may keep more commercial and 
residential properties in their private portfolio for investment purposes.  The 
number of commercial and residential properties in the salesperson’s personal 
portfolio is captured by Cpinv and Rpinv, respectively. The independent non-
franchise firm dummy variable is excluded from this regression; it is not 
expected that agents and brokers in these firms work more or less hours than 
others.11 
 
A sales professional’s income and residual income potentially influence hours 
worked. Agents and brokers who are successful at generating income are 
more likely to work more hours; the hours-income relationship is a two-way 
relationship. The natural logarithm of residual income (lnRinc) is included in 
the labor supply equation because of the negative relationship between leisure 
and hours worked (Moffitt (1984)). Salespersons decrease effort in favor of 
leisure as household income increases (Benjamin et al. (2009)).  In addition, 
there is the direct effect of income on hours worked; higher wages should 
increase hours worked (Moffitt (1984); Averett and Hotchkiss,(1994)) and 
this may also be true for income.   
 
Equation (2) also includes the fringe benefits variable (Benf); it is anticipated 
that this variable should have a positive relationship. Kimmel and Kniesner 
(1998) report that the wage labor supply with regard to hours worked is 
considerably more elastic for women than men; this finding is consistent with 
previous research. If fringe benefits are considered to be a substitute for 
wages, women may be willing to work more hours than men to obtain and 
keep those benefits. 
 
                                                                                                                   
worker. Likewise, lnFrev is an endogenous variable as firm revenue is defined as the 
natural logarithm of firm revenue generated by the individual salesperson. Hours 
worked is an endogenous variable because the availability of fringe benefits may 
influence hours worked; individuals may need to work more hours to qualify for fringe 
benefits. 
11 This variable is also subsequently tested in the Hrs regression equation, and it is 
found to be statistically insignificant. Because there is a system of equations with 
endogenous variables, it is necessary to exclude exogenous variables from each 
equation to properly identify the equations. 
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The third equation is the specification for sales professional productivity, 
which is measured by the natural logarithm of gross income equation as 
follows: 
=Gincln  Y ψ1 WBenfHrs µϕϕ +++ 32                       (3) 
where Y is the matrix of exogenous explanatory variables with regression 
coefficient matrix ψ1, and the other variables are previously defined. The 
individual regression coefficients are ψ2 and ψ3; and μW is the error term. The 
Y matrix includes the explanatory variables in the X (Hrs equation) matrix 
with the exception of lnGinc, lnRinc and on lnFrev. A commission split 
variable (Comspt) is included in the income equation (and not in the Hrs or 
Benf equations) to capture the percent of the commission split received by the 
sales professional.12  The commission split is measured at the beginning of the 
year to avoid endogeneity problems. Hours worked (Hrs) and fringe benefits 
(Benf) are expected to be positively related to income. 
 
The first step in the empirical process is the estimation of the measure of 
fringe benefits by using a factor analysis. In the second step, iterative 3SLS is 
employed to the system of the Benf, Hrs and lnGinc equations. The 3SLS 
procedure involves the application of generalized least squares in the 
simultaneous equation model (SEM); each of the equations is estimated by 
using 2SLS. The endogenous variables are estimated by using fitted values 
and all exogenous variables in the SEM. Once the coefficients from 2SLS are 
calculated, the cross-equation variances and covariances are estimated by 
using the residuals from each equation. In the final stage, the generalized least 
squares coefficients are estimated. 
 
An important problem associated with using 2SLS, 3SLS and SEMs is 
satisfying the order condition for proper identification. The number of 
excluded exogenous variables from an equation must be as least as large as 
the number of explanatory endogenous variables. Moreover, the excluded 
variables should be statistically significant in other equations.  If too many 
exogenous variables are excluded from an equation, but are included in the 
other equations, a problem of overidentification may occur, which results in a 
non-unique solution of SEM coefficients. The number of overidentifying 
restrictions is equal to the total number of exogenous variables in the system 
minus the total number of independent variables in a given equation. 
                                                     
12 As a practical matter, sales professionals who receive 100% commission (no split) 
are considered to be self-employed, so they are eliminated from the empirical 
estimation. Conversely, sales professionals who receive less than a 40% commission 
split are considered to be either in training or largely non-sales workers, as the most 
common commission split is between 60% and 70%. Therefore, they are also removed 
from the sample. 
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Therefore, exogenous variables appear in specific equations to achieve the 
rank condition.13 
 
5. Data 
 
The data on fringe benefits of real estate brokerage sales professions is 
obtained from the 2008 NAR® Member Survey.  The survey is for the 2007 
calendar year, and represents a random sample of individuals in real estate 
occupations, including appraisers, brokers, owners, managers, personal 
assistants, property managers and sales agents, and brokers. In February 2008, 
NAR® mailed an 89-question survey to a random sample of 72,000 Realtors®; 
an identical web-based online survey questionnaire was also distributed to 
another group of 89,400 members. A total of 9,997 responses were received, 
and the adjusted response rate is 7.7 percent after correcting for undeliverable 
questionnaires. Median single family home prices were also provided by 
NAR®; employment data was obtained from the BLS. These data sets were 
matched by zip code with NAR® data for conducting the regression analysis. 
 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of employer fringe benefits in various real 
estate occupations. The defined sales occupations include sales agent, 
associate broker, broker-owner (with selling) and manager (with selling). The 
fringe benefit categories include six insurance policies (health, dental, vision, 
life, disability, and E & O), a SEP/401K plan, paid vacation days and other 
benefits.14 E & O insurance is the most popular employer fringe benefit, and 
benefits the firm as much, or perhaps more than the individual.  Health 
insurance is the second most popular fringe benefit. Disability and vision 
insurance are the least offered employer fringe benefits at 6.7% and 7.5%, 
respectively. Table 3 also indicates that only about 2.1% of the sales agents 
receive health insurance, and 1.9% has a SEP/401K through the brokerage 
firm. In comparison, 15% - 30% of administrative support and personal 
assistant personnel receive these and other benefits. At the higher pay grade of 
non-sales activities occupations, about 59.4% of non-sales managers receive 
health insurance and 44.5% have a SEP/401K through the firm. In a direct 
comparison of managers and broker-owners with and without sales activities, 
selling personnel receive considerably fewer fringe benefits. Therefore, pay 
grade and selling/non-selling activity appear to greatly influence the receipt of 
fringe benefits compensation. 
                                                     
13  The three-equation SEM in this study omits statistically significant exogenous 
variables as follows: Cpinv, Rpinv and Comspt in the Benf equation, Comspt and Indnf  
in the Hrs equation, and Indnf and lnRinc in the lnGinc equation. The endogenous 
variables are lnGinc, lnFrev Hrs and Benf. For this reason, the SEM is exactly 
identified; therefore, the 3SLS SEM should produce consistent estimators. 
14 The survey question requests that the respondent indicate which (if any) of eight 
fringe benefits are received by the respondent through the brokerage firm; an 
additional category described as “other” is available with the opportunity to provide a 
write-in response. 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Employer Fringe Benefits by Real Estate Occupation. 
 Insurance  SEP - Paid Other   Sample 
Occupation Health Dental Vision  Life Disability  E & O  401K Vacation Benefit  Mean Size (N) 
Administrative support 28.09% 19.10% 14.61% 15.73% 6.74% 20.22% 16.85% 29.21% 1.12% 16.85% 89 
Appraiser 11.27% 3.76% 2.35% 6.10% 3.76% 20.19% 12.21% 5.16% 4.69% 7.72% 213 
Associate broker 2.26% 1.84% 1.42% 1.09% 1.59% 19.58% 2.26% 0.67% 1.67% 3.60% 1195 
Broker owner  
(no selling) 
31.69% 11.97% 4.93% 11.97% 5.63% 35.92% 17.61% 19.01% 2.82% 15.73% 142 
Broker-owner (selling) 15.98% 5.37% 3.78% 5.88% 3.27% 26.07% 5.74% 4.94% 2.61% 8.18% 1377 
Manager (no selling) 59.38% 38.28% 26.56% 35.94% 28.13% 54.69% 44.53% 63.28% 1.56% 39.15% 128 
Manager (selling) 21.14% 12.75% 9.06% 9.06% 6.04% 31.88% 12.75% 19.46% 2.35% 13.83% 298 
Personal assistant 23.21% 7.14% 5.36% 8.93% 5.36% 23.21% 8.93% 25.00% 1.79% 12.10% 56 
Property manager 26.57% 14.69% 8.39% 11.89% 7.69% 23.08% 12.59% 28.67% 4.90% 15.38% 143 
Relocation specialist 16.92% 9.23% 4.62% 13.85% 4.62% 27.69% 13.85% 13.85% 1.54% 11.79% 65 
Sales agent 2.08% 1.54% 0.84%  0.99% 0.76%  21.14%  1.92% 0.48% 1.76%  3.50% 6188 
Mean 21.69% 11.42% 7.45% 11.04% 6.69% 27.61% 13.57% 19.07% 2.44% 13.44% 9894 
Note: * Occupations in bold type indicate defined sales occupations. 
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Similar to most surveys of fringe benefits, the data is limited to a binary 
response by respondents as to whether or not they received specific fringe 
benefits; the dollar value of fringe benefits is not available. In an effort to 
aggregate the nine binary fringe benefit variables into a composite measure 
that is more robust, a factor analysis of fringe benefits is conducted. First, 
factor loadings and scoring coefficients are developed for the nine measures 
of fringe benefits. In the second step, the primary factor score is used as an 
independent variable in an iterative 3SLS regression model of income, hours 
worked and fringe benefits. 
 
Table 4 reports the findings of a fringe benefits factor analysis from 6,899 
respondents that consist of agents, brokers, managers and owners with selling 
responsibilities. In addition to the sales requirement, the subsample is limited 
to respondents who derive at least half of their real estate income from 
residential real estate brokerage. The method used is a principal components 
analysis, which seeks to find a linear combination of variables, to extract the 
maximum variance from the variables. The results of the factor analysis 
indicate that there are two fringe benefit factors with eigenvalues that exceed 
1.0, and these are reported in the table. The eigenvalue for the first two factors 
are 3.87 and 1.02, respectively. The proportion of variance explained by the 
first factor is 43%, and 11.3% by the second factor. The first factor has 
positive loadings with all of the fringe benefits variables while the second has 
positive loadings for E & O insurance, SP/401K plans, and the category of 
Other Benefits, although only E & O and Other Benefits have strong factor 
loadings. Unlike the other insurance products, E & O insurance is directly 
related to the job with the firm and may also benefit the employer in the event 
of a lawsuit. Therefore, the first fringe benefit factor appears to represent 
personal insurance products for the salesperson, while the second includes 
other non-insurance benefits and job-related E & O insurance. The 
standardized scoring coefficients are shown in the last two right hand side 
columns. These scores and factor loadings are used to estimate the fringe 
benefits variable. Because the explained variance and eigenvalue of the 
second factor are relatively weak, only the first fringe benefit factor scores are 
retained for the second step.15  
 
In the next stage, a 3SLS regression analysis is conducted for the income, 
hours and fringe benefits equations. Because the focus of the study is on 
fringe benefits received through the firm, agents on 100% contracts are 
excluded from the sample. These sales professionals may solely and directly 
determine the fringe benefits that they receive, and therefore, the income-
hours-fringe benefits relationship may be different for them, compared with 
others who do not have direct control. On the other end of the split 
commission scale, sales professionals who receive low splits may have 
                                                     
15 The second factor scores were estimated for the iterative 3SLS procedure. As 
anticipated, the second factor coefficient is statistically insignificant in all three 
regressions. 
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inadequate incentives to be categorized with the other sales professionals.16 
Real estate sales professionals typically receive half or more of the 
commission split with the firm, and agents with a low commission split may 
be trainees, or receiving a fixed salary.17  
 
Table 4 Factor Analysis of Fringe Benefits of Real Estate Sales 
Professionals 
 Factor Loading Factor Variance Std. Scoring Coefficients 
Fringe Benefit Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Health Insurance 0.782 -0.023 0.612 0.001 0.202 -0.023 
Dental Insurance 0.815 -0.069 0.664 0.005 0.211 -0.068 
Vision Insurance 0.761 -0.059 0.579 0.003 0.197 -0.058 
Life Insurance 0.780 -0.044 0.609 0.002 0.202 -0.043 
Disability Insurance 0.678 -0.005 0.460 0.000 0.175 -0.005 
Errors and Omission 
Insurance 0.315 0.422 0.099 0.178 0.081 0.415 
SEP/401K Plan 0.638 0.005 0.408 0.000 0.165 0.005 
Paid Vacation 0.658 -0.068 0.433 0.005 0.170 -0.067 
Other Fringe Benefit 0.071 0.908 0.005 0.824 0.018 0.892 
Eigenvalue   3.869 1.018   
Proportion of 
Variance   0.430 0.113   
N   6,899    
 
 
The summary statistics for the variables in the regression analysis are shown 
in Table 5. The mean hours worked is more than 40 hours, with salespersons 
who have about 14.9 years of schooling and 10.3 years of experience. Females 
and ethnic minorities represent about 60% and 12% of the sample, 
respectively. About 73% of the sample consists of sales agents with another 
16% designated as associate brokers; the remaining 11% are managers or 
owners with selling responsibilities. For every 100 sales professionals, there 
are 78 residential properties in their combined personal portfolio and about 12 
commercial properties are in their portfolio. The sample has many more 
independent firms than subsidiaries of a national or regional corporation; 
about 36% and 45% are franchise and non-franchise independent firms, 
respectively. Although biased slightly upwards, the average commission split 
received by the salesperson is about 66.1%.  In comparing the female and 
male subsamples, women on average work approximately 2.78 fewer hours. 
                                                     
16 In subsequent analyses, the difference between the coefficients including and 
excluding sole owners and/or 100% commission salespersons is negligible because of 
the relatively small number of individuals in these groups, but in theory, the exercise 
of control could distort the findings.  
17 By using this approach, salespersons with less than a 40% split are excluded from 
the sample, which results in a reduction of 65 observations. 
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In addition, males are more likely to be broker-owners as well as managers 
with selling responsibilities. 
 
Table 5 Summary Statistics of Sample 
 Total Females Males 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N 
lnGinc 10.554 1.087 1533 10.478 1.077 916 10.665 1.095 617 
Hrs 40.840 15.457 1533 39.721 15.010 916 42.502 15.967 617 
Benf -0.049 0.879 1533 -0.066 0.839 916 -0.024 0.936 617 
Sch 14.928 1.952 1533 14.821 1.927 916 15.086 1.979 617 
Exp 10.296 9.194 1533 10.391 9.149 916 10.154 9.265 617 
Expsq 190.470 303.287 1533 191.587 301.067 916 188.812 306.790 617 
Married 0.709 0.454 1533 0.683 0.465 916 0.747 0.435 617 
Female 0.598 0.491 1533 1.000 0.000 916 0.000 0.000 617 
Black 0.040 0.196 1533 0.043 0.202 916 0.036 0.186 617 
Hisp 0.046 0.210 1533 0.040 0.197 916 0.055 0.228 617 
Asian 0.037 0.189 1533 0.036 0.186 916 0.039 0.194 617 
Abrk 0.162 0.368 1533 0.172 0.378 916 0.146 0.353 617 
Brkown 0.064 0.245 1533 0.044 0.204 916 0.094 0.292 617 
Mgrsel 0.041 0.199 1533 0.034 0.181 916 0.052 0.222 617 
Comspt (%) 66.121 13.782 1533 65.650 13.635 916 66.820 13.978 617 
Cpinv 0.122 0.600 1533 0.100 0.546 916 0.154 0.672 617 
Rpinv 0.781 1.642 1533 0.709 1.454 916 0.890 1.883 617 
Indf 0.363 0.481 1533 0.344 0.475 916 0.392 0.489 617 
Indnf 0.449 0.498 1533 0.455 0.498 916 0.439 0.497 617 
lnFsize 4.380 1.802 1533 4.435 1.795 916 4.297 1.809 617 
lnMpsh 5.532 0.527 1533 5.511 0.527 916 5.563 0.526 617 
Chgemp 
(%) 1.032 1.314 1533 1.041 1.322 916 1.019 1.302 617 
lnFrev 9.775 1.101 1533 9.727 1.103 916 9.847 1.095 617 
lnRinc 8.370 4.803 1533 8.836 4.564 916 7.679 5.063 617 
 
 
6. Findings 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the income, hours and fringe benefits regressions 
for the combined sample of men and women.  The χ2 statistics of the three 
regressions are statistically significant at the 1% level. The fringe benefits 
variable does not have units of measure that are readily interpretable; 
therefore, the table also reports the standardized beta. It also permits the 
comparison of coefficients based on the change in standard deviation of the 
variable. 
 
 
Fringe Benefits Compensation of Real Estate Agents and Brokers    271 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Table 6 Iterative 3SLS Regressions of Income, Hours and Fringe 
Benefits. 
 Dependent Variable: lnGinc 
Dependent Variable: 
Hrs 
Dependent Variable: 
Benf 
Variable Coef. Std. Beta T-Value Coef. 
Std. 
Beta T-Value Coef. 
Std. 
Beta T-Value 
Intercept 6.177 - 18.928** -39.556 - -6.826** -1.101 - -2.971** 
Sch 0.012 0.021 1.014 -0.233 -0.029 -1.256 0.003 0.007 0.290 
Exp 0.065 0.546 8.610** -0.501 -0.298 -4.140** 0.003 0.035 0.447 
Exp2 -0.001 -0.385 -6.230** 0.011 0.207 2.972** 0.342 a 0.001 0.016 
Married 0.171 0.071 3.460** -1.864 -0.055 -2.178* -0.063 -0.033 -1.184 
Female -0.042 -0.019 -0.912 -0.747 -0.024 -1.009 -0.027 -0.015 -0.599 
Black -0.246 -0.044 -2.142* 0.734 0.009 0.401 -0.073 -0.016 -0.645 
Hisp -0.399 -0.077 -3.708** 5.478 0.075 3.194** -0.141 -0.034 -1.335 
Asian 0.054 0.009 0.444 -2.172 -0.027 -1.114 -0.008 -0.002 -0.068 
Abrk 0.024 0.008 0.376 0.916 0.022 0.918 -0.034 -0.014 -0.553 
Brkown 0.012 0.003 0.121 3.918 0.062 2.593** 0.184 0.051 1.983* 
Mgrsel 0.087 0.016 0.752 1.906 0.024 1.036 0.781 0.176 6.996** 
Cpinv 0.080 0.044 2.104* -0.836 -0.032 -1.374 - - - 
Rpinv 0.050 0.076 3.583** -0.669 -0.071 -3.003** - - - 
Comspt (%) 0.016 0.197 9.631** - - - - - - 
Indf 0.040 0.018 0.858 0.567 -0.017 0.764 -0.195 -0.106 -3.079** 
Indnf - - - - - - -0.126 -0.071 -2.019* 
lnFsize 0.038 0.064 2.959** 0.199 0.023 0.960 0.029 0.060 2.221* 
lnMpsh 0.146 0.071 3.263** -1.212 -0.041 -1.696 0.067 0.040 1.529 
Chgemp 
(%) 0.055 0.065 3.155
** -0.127 -0.011 -0.455 0.016 0.024 0.933 
lnRinc - - - -0.264 -0.082 -3.245** 0.008 0.041 1.402 
lnGinc 
(predicted) - - - 9.207 0.648 25.485
** -0.048 -0.060 -1.419 
lnFrev 
(predicted) - - - - - - 0.092 0.115 3.066
** 
Hrs 
(predicted) 0.039 0.556 27.734
** - - - 0.004 0.068 2.471* 
Benf 
(predicted) 0.036 0.029 1.379 1.118 0.067 2.870
** - - - 
Log 
Likelihood   -2008.91   -6248.15   -1915.95 
χ2   588.80   248.14   123.00 
N   1533   1533   1533 
Note: a. Coefficient multiplied by 10-5. 
* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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In the lnGinc equation, the coefficients on the demographic, skill, firm and 
economic environment variables have signs and magnitudes consistent with 
apriori expectations and previous research. The gross income of the sales 
professional is positively related to experience, marital status, holdings of 
residential and commercial investment properties, the commission rate, firm 
size, metro housing price and the change in employment, and negatively 
related to minority status. Hours worked is positively related to income and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The fringe benefits coefficient, 
however, is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
 
The Hrs equation results are shown in the next three columns of Table 6. The 
results indicate that more experienced salespersons work about half an hour a 
week less per year of experience. This decrease occurs at a decreasing rate. 
Similarly, salespersons who own residential properties for investment 
purposes work fewer hours. As expected, hours worked are positively and 
significantly related to real estate gross income (lnGinc), but negatively 
related to residual income (lnRinc). Therefore, higher real estate income from 
the salesperson encourages more hours of work, but salespersons choose to 
substitute more leisure as residual income from the household increases.  
 
The primary variable of interest is fringe benefits (Benf), reported at the 
bottom of the table. The fringe benefits coefficient of 1.118 is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The beta coefficient indicates that a one standard 
deviation change in the fringe benefits variable is associated with a 0.067 
standard deviation change in hours worked. The standard deviation of Benf is 
0.88; therefore, a one standard deviation increase in Benf is estimated to 
increase hours worked by about 0.059 hours per week. The impact of the Benf 
beta coefficient is considerably smaller than that of lnGinc, as expected, and 
more comparable to the residual income (lnRinc) in terms of magnitude of the 
coefficient and standard deviation.  
 
The Benf equation results are shown in the last three columns of Table 6. 
Managers who also sell and broker-owners have more fringe benefits than 
sales agents. In comparison, the standardized coefficient for managers with 
selling responsibilities (Mgrsel)) is about three times as large as that for 
broker-owners (Brkow). Firm characteristics influence fringe benefits as well. 
Independent franchises and non-franchises offer less generous fringe benefits 
than company subsidiaries, and fringe benefits compensation increases with 
firm size. Hours worked has a positive and statistically significant relation 
with fringe benefits; the Hrs standardized coefficient of 0.068 indicates that a 
one standard deviation increase in hours worked (15.4 hours) is associated 
with a 0.068 standard deviation increase in fringe benefits units, which has a 
mean of approximately zero and a standard deviation of 0.94. While lnGinc 
beta coefficient of -0.06 is relatively small and not statistically significant, the 
impact of the natural logarithm of firm revenue (lnFrev) is substantially larger 
as shown by the standardized beta coefficient of 0.115. In this case, a one 
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standard deviation increase in firm revenue is associated with a 0.115 standard 
deviation increase in fringe benefits. 
  
Table 7 presents the results of the 3SLS regressions for the female subsample. 
The three regressions are each statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Although the subsample size is about 60% the size of the combined sample, 
the individual regressions in general show stronger relationships. In the 
lnGinc equation, the Benf coefficient is not statistically significant, consistent 
with the findings in the combined sample. In the Hrs equation, however, the 
relationship between fringe benefits and hours worked appears even stronger 
than in the combined sample. A one standard-deviation increase in fringe 
benefits is associated with a 0.095 standard deviation increase in hours 
worked per week. In the Benf equation, Brkown and Mrgsel are statistically 
significant and have a strong economic impact as well. Managers who are also 
sales professionals, for example, have substantially more fringe benefits than 
non-managers.  In addition to demographics, firm type has somewhat more 
statistically significant standardized coefficients for the female only sample, 
and these coefficients tend to be 40% to 55% larger in absolute value 
magnitude compared to the combined sample.  The standardized beta for 
lnFsize is likewise 58% larger for the combined sample. Similarly, the 
standardized coefficient for Hrs is 34% larger for the combined sample. 
 
The results of the 3SLS regressions for the male subsample are shown in 
Table 8. In general, the regressions are not as strong as those for females; 
however, all regressions are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The Benf 
coefficient approaches statistical significance at the 0.05 level in the lnGinc 
equation, but nonetheless falls short. In the Hrs equation, the Benf coefficient 
in the male subsample is much smaller in magnitude compared to the female 
subsample coefficient, and not statistically significant. This suggests that 
increasing fringe benefits compensation does not increase hours of work. The 
fringe benefits equation for the male subsample is generally not as strong 
compared to the female subsample fringe benefits equation. However, 
experience is positive and statistically significant, unlike in the female and 
combined samples. A one standard deviation in experience (9.3 years) is 
associated with a 0.32 standard deviation change in fringe benefits. The 
primary coefficient of interest is managers who sell (Mgrsel); it is about a 
third larger than the Mgrsel coefficient shown for females in Table 6.  Unlike 
the Benf equation for the female subsample, the coefficients for firm 
characteristics (Indf, Indnf, and lnFsize), firm revenue (lnFrev) and hours 
worked (Hrs) are not statistically significant. 
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Variable Dependent Variable: lnGinc Dependent Variable: Hrs Dependent Variable: Benf 
Coef. Std. Beta T-Value Coef. Std. Beta T-Value Coef. Std. Beta T-Value 
Intercept 5.546 - 13.180** -32.403 - -4.400** -0.497 - -1.108** 
Sch 0.029 0.051 1.877 -0.393 -0.050 -1.656 -0.011 -0.024 -0.740 
Exp 0.070 0.596 7.445** -0.539 -0.328 -3.591** -0.010 -0.111 -1.107 
Exp2 -0.001 -0.416 -5.337** 0.011 0.220 2.500* 0.289 a 0.104 1.077 
Married 0.194 0.084 3.143** -1.150 -0.036 -1.048 -0.085 -0.047 -1.250 
Black -0.417 -0.078 -2.915** 1.477 0.020 0.659 -0.022 -0.005 -0.164 
Hisp -0.437 -0.080 -2.973** 5.847 0.077 2.554** -0.103 -0.024 -0.738 
Asian 0.127 0.022 0.784 -2.484 -0.031 -0.987 0.194 0.043 1.268 
Abrk 0.078 0.027 1.003 -0.224 -0.006 -0.184 0.008 0.004 0.113 
Brkown -0.197 -0.037 -1.375 6.209 0.085 2.792** 0.182 0.044 1.343 
Mgrsel 0.019 0.003 0.118 2.143 0.026 0.853 0.491 0.106 3.234** 
Cpinv 0.084 0.043 1.591 -1.156 -0.042 -1.396 - - - 
Rpinv 0.015 0.021 0.763 -0.070 -0.007 -0.223 - - - 
Comspt (%) 0.015 0.184 6.939** - - - - - - 
Indf 0.092 0.040 1.507 -0.220 -0.007 -0.232 -0.261 -0.148 -3.382** 
Indnf - - - - - - -0.185 -0.110 -2.483* 
lnFsize 0.031 0.052 1.879 0.080 0.010 0.306 0.044 0.095 2.729** 
lnMpsh 0.204 0.100 3.555** -2.277 -0.080 -2.526* 0.040 0.025 0.737 
Chgemp (%) 0.055 0.067 2.465* -0.012 -0.001 -0.035 0.020 0.032 0.960 
lnRinc - - - -0.360 -0.109 -3.277** 0.013 0.072 1.838 
lnGinc (predicted) - - - 9.301 0.667 20.724** -0.102 -0.131 -2.390* 
lnFrev (predicted) - - - - - - 0.117 0.154 3.109** 
Hrs (predicted) 0.041 0.572 22.306** - - - 0.005 0.097 2.700** 
Benf (predicted) 0.005 0.004 0.131 1.700 0.095 3.158** - - - 
Log Likelihood   -1189.26   -3703.213   -1100.664 
χ2   355.46   154.41   75.81 
N   916   916   916 
Notes: a. Multiply coefficient by 10-3; * Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 7 Iterative 3SLS Regressions of Female Income, Hours and Fringe Benefits. 
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 Dependent Variable: lnGinc Dependent Variable: Hrs Dependent Variable: Benf 
Variable Coef. Std. Beta T-Value Coef. Std. Beta T-Value Coef. Std. Beta T-Value 
Intercept 6.990 - 13.786** -52.772 - -5.392** -2.050 - -3.285** 
Sch -0.008 -0.015 -0.465 -0.044 -0.005 -0.147 0.015 0.032 0.829 
Exp 0.057 0.481 4.483** -0.442 -0.257 -2.116* 0.032 0.320 2.515** 
Exp2 -0.001 -0.347 -3.334** 0.010 0.190 1.626 -0.664 -0.218 -1.775 
Married 0.149 0.059 1.836 -2.979 -0.081 -2.141* -0.112 -0.052 -1.299 
Black 0.053 0.009 0.278 -0.478 -0.006 -0.152 -0.185 -0.037 -0.956 
Hisp -0.307 -0.064 -1.944 4.402 0.063 1.693 -0.240 -0.059 -1.500 
Asian -0.029 -0.005 -0.156 -2.427 -0.029 -0.783 -0.322 -0.067 -1.687 
Abrk -0.033 -0.011 -0.312 2.643 0.058 1.525 -0.160 -0.061 -1.497 
Brkown 0.145 0.039 1.126 2.631 0.048 1.248 0.127 0.040 0.987 
Mgrsel 0.166 0.034 0.996 2.198 0.031 0.799 1.001 0.237 6.068** 
Cpinv 0.066 0.040 1.196 -0.337 -0.014 -0.372 - - - 
Rpinv 0.077 0.132 3.882** -1.168 -0.138 -3.597** - - - 
Cspt (%) 0.017 0.216 6.660** - - - - - - 
Indf -0.018 -0.008 -0.244 1.412 0.043 1.189 -0.067 -0.035 -0.628 
Indnf - - - - - - -0.003 -0.002 -0.032 
lnFsize 0.054 0.090 2.640** 0.304 0.034 0.895 0.001 0.002 0.048 
lnMpsh 0.055 0.026 0.769 0.531 0.018 0.453 0.127 0.071 1.761 
Chgemp (%) 0.057 0.068 2.056* -0.353 -0.029 -0.766 0.003 0.005 0.119 
lnRinc - - - -0.159 -0.051 -1.288 0.005 0.026 0.598 
lnGinc (predicted) - - - 9.168 0.628 15.150** 0.027 0.032 0.495 
lnFrev (predicted) - - - - - - 0.059 0.070 1.241 
Hrs (predicted) 0.037 0.533 16.706** - - - 0.002 0.028 0.670 
Benf (predicted) 0.075 0.065 1.901 0.503 0.029 0.771 - - - 
Log Likelihood   -799.749   -2524.11   -783.219 
χ2   261.99   120.58   101.66 
N   617   617   617 
Notes: a. Multiply coefficient by 10-3; * Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 8 Iterative 3SLS Regressions of Male Income, Hours and Fringe Benefits. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This study has examined employer-based fringe benefits compensation of real 
estate sales professionals. Fringe benefits studies most often focus on hourly 
or salaried workers and studies of fringe benefits of sales professionals have 
been relatively uncommon. This study transforms fringe benefits by using a 
factor analysis to construct a continuous aggregated variable, and thereafter, 
models fringe benefits with income and hours as a set of three interrelated 
equations.  
 
The findings suggest that income, hours worked and fringe benefits are 
interrelated and should be jointly estimated. The offering of fringe benefits 
increases hours worked; likewise, hours worked also increases fringe benefits. 
While a strong positive effect of hours worked exists for women, this 
relationship is not statistically significant for men. This finding suggests that 
women find fringe benefits as an enticing incentive to work additional hours; 
men apparently are not motivated as much by fringe benefits. If fringe 
benefits are considered a substitute for more income or wages, this result is 
consistent with the findings by Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) and others of a 
more elastic wage labor supply coefficient for women versus men.  That is, 
women are willing to work more hours for higher wages, but also appear to 
respond to offerings of employer fringe benefits. 
 
For the combined sample of men and women, income is not associated with 
an increase in fringe benefits. However, there are differences based on gender. 
For men, the fringe benefit coefficient is positive, and while short of statistical 
significant in the income equation, there appears to be some evidence that 
fringe benefits may entice men to work harder and generate additional 
income. For women, fringe benefits do not have a statistically significant 
impact on income. Olson (2002) reports that married women with health 
insurance through their employer accept about 20% lower wages than if they 
worked on a job without fringe benefits. Therefore, the finding that the fringe 
benefits coefficient is close to statistical significance at the 0.05 level and 
positive in the income equation for men, but not near statistical significance 
for women (despite the considerably larger sample), may be indirectly 
supportive of Olson’s finding.  
 
The incongruence in these findings could relate to how men and women view 
fringe benefits, and also, suggest that different motivational and incentive 
structures should be considered as firms need to attract sales talent. It should 
be noted that women work fewer hours per week on average, which makes it 
more difficult for them to qualify for fringe benefits based on either the hours 
worked or productivity measures, such as sales quotas. 
 
In the combined sample, fringe benefits are elevated for broker-owners and 
managers with selling responsibilities; compared to sales agents; associate 
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broker status does not offer additional fringe benefits. If associate broker 
status is viewed as a promotion, it may offer monetary advantages, but fringe 
benefits do not appear to be augmented. Conversely, management and 
ownership are objectives agents and brokers are strongly related to receiving 
additional fringe benefits. 
 
 Independent firms offer fewer fringe benefits, and in addition, larger firms 
offer more fringe benefits. This is consistent with the findings of most other 
research in which larger firms tend to offer more fringe benefits; these 
findings augment the literature by showing that independent firms offer fewer 
benefits. This finding could be related to the employer’s ability to secure cost-
effective fringe benefits packages; moreover, subsidiaries of larger firms may 
be able to negotiate more favorable terms. 
 
In addition to agent management and ownership functions, firm size and 
structure, the hours worked, and the firm-generated revenue by the agent are 
all positively and significantly related to fringe benefits. An analysis by 
gender reveals, however, that this relationship is confined to the female 
subsample. One explanation is that females choose to receive fringe benefits 
through firm revenue thresholds or targets; males may prefer to receive 
compensation in income and purchase fringe benefits themselves.  
 
An interesting finding is that as sales professionals increase their income, 
holding constant the firm’s portion of revenue, there is evidence that they will 
receive fewer fringe benefits from the firm. While this relationship is just 
short of a 0.05 level of significance for the combined sample, it has strong 
statistical significance for the female subsample. This finding is consistent 
with the theory that when a firm offers a total compensation package to an 
agent or broker; if more income is desired, given a level of revenue produced 
by the agent or broker for the firm, fringe benefits are less.  
 
Neither ethnicity nor gender appears to influence fringe benefits for either 
men or women; however, experience is a factor that influences the men’s 
interest in fringe benefits. Women do not seem to increase fringe benefits 
consumption as their experience increases.  
 
Residual income in the household is often ignored in the system of 
productivity, hours and fringe benefits equations. Consistent with the wage-
hours models, additional residual income decreases hours worked. However, 
while residual income is positively associated with fringe benefits, the 
relationship is not statistically significant. 
 
This study offers the potential for additional research questions. While it 
examines fringe benefits as a whole, the effect of individual fringe benefits on 
income and hours worked has not been examined. Also, only real estate sales 
professionals have been included in the regression analysis; no analysis has 
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been conducted for others, such as appraisers, property managers and personal 
assistants and administrative support staff. 
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